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Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when
the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained
mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at
the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity
irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less
efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third
best one, that is, the optimal budget constrained output is strictly
lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the
budget constraint is too strong, then we have full bunching.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the problem of financing infrastructure when the
public authority faces financial constraints and when the cost of the producer
is unknown. Financing infrastructure is a major issue in every economy.
Building up roads, bridges, railways, water-ways, airways, water supplies,
electricity and public services such as health and education is necessary for
the development of an economy. The benefits of infrastructure being widely
recognized, the main problem is to raise funds to finance it. Infrastructures
are either financed completely by public funds (for example, in the case of
public goods which we address in this paper), or is financed partially by the
private sector. An example of the second case is network industries, where
the essential facility is partially financed by the private competitors that
use it. However, liberalization and open-access policies do not eliminate
the necessity to finance infrastructure. In network industries, the regulators
should not only guarantee an open-access of the network to competitors
(through adequate access charge) but should also guarantee the financing
of infrastructures. If the essential facility cannot be financed completely
with the access charge, public funds should be invested to guarantee the
continuity and the quality of the service provided. In this context railway
tracks is a good example.1
Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) developed a
procedure to finance infrastructure, when the cost of the monopolist firm is
unknown to the regulator. The main property of the optimal or second best
mechanism is full separability of types, that is, if the monopolist is a high
(low) cost type then she produces lower (higher) quantity and recieve a lower
(higher) transfer. The cost of this separability of types under asymmetric
information is the information rent enjoyed by the lower cost types. In the
optimal mechanism all but the lowest cost firm produce less than first best
to reduce the information rent. Unfortunately, if infrastructure projects
are numerous, public funds are usually scarce. It is reasonable to imagine
that the fund provider may be unable to finance the infrastructure at the
level required for the optimal mechanism (Baron and Myerson (1982)). The
aim of this paper is to construct the optimal mechanism when the available
fund is limited. We call this mechanism the optimal budget-constrained
mechanism. We highlight the differences between the optimal mechanism
1In July 2000, the British Government publised its ten year plan, announcing a £60
billion investment package for the railways. Approximately £30 billion would come from
the government itself, via the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA)-Source: SRA Annual Report
2000-2001.
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and the budget-constrained one.
To illustrate our problem, suppose that a local community plans to fi-
nance a public good for its citizens. In developing countries, budgets for
investment are limited, mainly because the local communities do not have
access to credit. This procurement problem is a mechanism design problem
if the fund provider does not know the cost conditions under which a firm
can supply the public good. Efficiency prescribes that the regulator uses the
private information of the firm and that the quantity supplied by a more
efficient (or low cost) firm is more than that of a less efficient (or high cost)
firm. To achive the same, the regulator uses its money to pay an infor-
mation rent in order to separate out the more efficient firms from the less
efficient ones. However, if public funds are limited, the regulator could be
better off if it manage to reduce the monopolist’s rent. The optimal budget-
constrained mechanism prescribes that the firm supplies a good of lower
quantity (compared to the second best quantity) and that the more efficient
types of firm produce the same quantity independently of its cost. These
two distortions reduces the information rent and the quantity produced by
the more efficient firm. However, if the financial constraint is too strong, the
budget-constrained mechanism prescribes full bunching. The regulator has
two instruments to limit the transfer: bunching for the more efficient firms
and under-production. Our comparative static result show that a reduction
in available fund reduces the quantities produced by all types of firms and
increases the interval in which there is bunching.
In many models of regulation, it is assumed that public subsidies are
costly. Transferring one dollar to the firm costs the authority (1 + λ) dol-
lars, where λ represents the shadow cost of public funds (see Laffont and
Tirole (1993)). This approach is relevant when the public authority itself
regulates the monopolist. Our approach applies when the task of regula-
tion is delegated to an agency to which the authority allocates funds (like
in the British Government and Strategic Rail Authority example). Thus,
our framework is different since we consider the case in which the public
authority specifies a maximal level of subsidy that the regulatory agency
can use to finance the infrastructure. Finally, we do not model how the
highest subsidy is determined by the political authority and consider it as
exogenously given.
There are several papers dealing with mechanism design problems under
asymmetric information and financial constraint. Laffont and Robert (1996)
describe the optimal auction when all the bidders have a financial constraint
which is common knowledge. Like in our optimal budget-constraint mecha-
nism, the financial constraint in Laffont and Roberts (1996) reduces the bids
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of all participants (even those with a low valuation for the good). Che and
Gale (2000) extends the result in Laffont and Roberts (1996) by relaxing
the assumption that financial constraints are common knowledge. Monteiro
and Page Jr. (1998) describe the optimal selling mechanisms for multiprod-
uct monopolists in the presence of budget constrained buyers. To construct
the optimal budget-constrained mechanism, we extend the methodology of
Thomas (2002). Thomas (2002) considers the incentive problem of a mo-
nopolist who faces financially constrained buyers. Surprisingly, in his mech-
anism, the financial constraint may imply over-consumption (relative to the
complete information case) for some types of buyers for whom the separa-
bility property holds in the constrained mechanism. In contrast, our mech-
anism imply underproduction for all types, whenever the available budget is
lower than the highest transfer required in the optimal mechanism. Finally,
Gautier (2002) considers the regulator’s mechanism design problem under
financial constraint when there are two types of firm. In Gautier (2002),
bunching is an issue only if the financial constraint is sufficiently strong.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we develop
the benchmark model. In Section 3, we introduce and analyze the mecha-
nism design problem under budget constraint. We conclude our analysis in
Section 4. All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The utility of the monopolist is Um = t− θq where t is the transfer that she
receives from the regulator and θ is her marginal cost and q is the quantity
of the public good she produces. The utility function of the regulator is
Ur = S(q) − t where S(q) is the consumer’s surplus when a quantity q
of public good is supplied and t is the transfer to the monopolist. S(q) is
assumed to be twice differentiable with S′(q) > 0, S′′(q) < 0 and S′(0) =∞.
The regulator’s main objective is to select the quantity q to maximize Ur.
Since S′(0) = ∞, the good is always produced. If the regulator knows the
marginal cost θ of the monopolist, then the optimal quantity is qf (θ) =
S′−1(θ) and the optimal transfer to the monopolist is t(θ) = θqf (θ). The
pair 〈qf (θ), tf (θ)〉 is the first best outcome.
We assume that the marginal cost of the monopolist is private informa-
tion. In this context, we assume that the marginal cost of the monopolist θ
belongs to the interval [θ, θ] where 0 < θ < θ. This interval is assumed to be
common knowledge. It is also common knowledge that (i) the marginal cost
has a continuous and almost everywhere differentiable density f(θ) for all
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θ ∈ (θ, θ) and that (ii) f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The regulator’s objective is
to maximizes
∫ θ
θ {S(q(θ))− t(θ)} f(θ)dθ subject to incentive compatibility
constraint (or IC) and participation constraint (or PC). A direct mecha-
nism M = 〈q(.), t(.)〉, in this context, simply specifies a type contingent
quantity-transfer pair. Here q : [θ, θ] → R+ and t : [θ, θ] → R+. For
simplicity we restrict attention to continuous and almost everywhere dif-
ferentiable mechanisms. Let Um(θ; θ′) = t(θ′) − θq(θ′) be the utility of the
monopolist under the mechanismM if her true type is θ and if she announces
θ′ ∈ [θ, θ]. With slight abuse of notation, let us define Um(θ) ≡ Um(θ; θ),
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Given these definitions, incentive compatibility states that
Um(θ) ≥ Um(θ; θ′), for all pairs {θ, θ′} ∈ [θ, θ]2 and participation constraint
states that Um(θ) ≥ 0, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. It is well known in the literature that
the optimal mechanism M satisfies both the incentive compatibility con-
straint and the participation constraint if and only if the utility of any type
θ ∈ [θ, θ] is given by Um(θ) =
∫ θ
θ q(τ)dτ and the optimal type-contingent
quantity q(θ) is non-increasing in θ.2
We will refer to the mechanism design problem of the regulator, stated
in the previous paragraph, as the benchmark model. The optimal (or sec-
ond best) mechanism for the benchmark model is summarized in the next
Proposition. Before stating the Proposition we provide two relevant defini-
tions. For any θ ∈ [θ, θ], let L(θ) ≡ F (θ)f(θ) be the hazard rate function where
F (.) is the distribution function associated with the density function f(.).
For any θ ∈ [θ, θ], let z(θ) ≡ θ + L(θ) be the virtual type function.
PROPOSITION 1 The optimal mechanism is M b = 〈qb(.), tb(.)〉 where
1. qb(θ) = S′−1(z(θ)) and
2. tb(θ) = θqb(θ) +
θ∫
θ
qb(τ)dτ ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]
We omit the proof of Proposition 1 since it is quite well known in the
literature (see Baron and Myerson (1982)). It is important to observe that
2The reason for the necessity of non-increasingness of optimal quantity follows directly
by solving the inequality in the definition of IC for any pair of types. The reason for
the necessity of Um(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
q(τ)dτ is the following. For IC to hold, it is necessary that
U ′m(θ) = −q(θ) for almost all θ ∈ (θ, θ). Under the optimal mechanism PC implies that
Um(θ) = 0. These two conditions together imply that Um(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
q(τ)dτ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
The sufficiency part is quite straightforward.
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for the benchmark model it is necessary that qb(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈
[θ, θ]. Non-increasingness of quantity is satisfied if and only if the virtual
type z(θ) is non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Given that z(θ) is non-decreasing,
we get qb(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Moreover, since L(θ) > 0 for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ] and z(θ) > θ, we get qb(θ) < qf (θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ] and qb(θ) =
qf (θ). Thus, for all but the lowest cost firm, we have underproduction under
second best compared to the first best. For our main problem, to be analyzed
in the next section, we take the following assumption which is stronger than
non-decreasingness of the virtual type function z(.).
ASSUMPTION 1 For almost all θ ∈ (θ, θ), θ(1 + L′(θ)) ≥ 2L(θ).
For assumption 1, it is necessary that z(θ) is non-decreasing for all
θ(∈ [θ, θ]) for which assumption 1 holds. Observe that non-decreasingness
of z(θ) means that 1+L′(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). This is clearly a necessary
condition for assumption 1 since θ > 0 and L(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. For all
density functions with the property that f ′(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ), assump-
tion 1 is satisfied. Therefore, Exponential Distribution, Pareto Distribution
and Uniform Distribution satisfies assumption 1. Under certain parametric
restrictions Beta Distributions, Gamma Distributions and Weibull Distribu-
tions also satisfy assumption 1. Among the class of distributions with the
property that there exists a non-empty interval (a, b) such that f ′(θ) > 0
for all θ ∈ (a, b), Triangular Distribution satisfy assumption 1. A Normal
Distribution satisfies assumption 1 if and only if 2σ
2x
(2σ2+x(µ−x)) ≥ L(x) for all
x ∈ (θ, µ) where the mean µ = (θ+θ)2 and σ is the standard deviation. For
Logistic and Laplace Distributions, the sufficiency conditions are θ ≥
√
3
pi σ
and θ ≥ σ√
2
respectively.3
3 Budget Constraint
In the benchmark problem we have a fully separating mechanism where
the optimal transfer is strictly decreasing in type. Complete separation is
feasible if the maximum fund available to the regulator (or the regulator’s
budget constraint) T¯ exceeds the transfer that needs to be provided to the
3We obtained the condition for Normal Distribution by taking doubly-truncated Nor-
mal Distribution following Hald’s (1952) convention. The same double truncation tech-
nique was applied to obtain the sufficiency conditions with Logistic and Laplace Distribu-
tions. For all these three Distributions we assumed symmetry around the mean µ =
θ+θ
2
.
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lowest type tb(θ).4 However, if this fund is less than the transfer needed to
separate out all types, that is if T¯ < tb(θ), then the regulator’s problem is
[P ∗] max
〈q(θ),t(θ)〉
θ∫
θ
{S(q(θ))− t(θ)} f(θ)dθ,
subject to
1. Um(θ) ≥ Um(θ; θ′), ∀{θ, θ′} ∈ [θ, θ]2,
2. Um(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] and
3. t(θ) ≤ T¯ ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
The optimal budget-constrained mechanism for [P ∗] is summarized in the
next Theorem.
THEOREM 1 Under Assumption 1, the optimal budget constrained mech-
anism for [P ∗] is M∗ ≡ 〈q∗(.), t∗(.), θ˜〉 where
1.
q∗(θ) =
 q
∗(θ˜) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜)
S′−1
(
z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ)
)
∀θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]
with Ψ(θ˜) = F (θ˜)
2
θ˜f(θ˜)−F (θ˜) > 0 = Ψ(θ) for all θ˜ ∈ (θ, θ],
2.
t∗(θ) =

T¯ (≡ t∗(θ˜)) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜)
θq∗(θ) +
θ∫
θ
q∗(τ)dτ ∀θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]
3. the optimal cut-off point θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ] is obtained from T¯ = θ˜q∗(θ˜) +
θ∫˜
θ
q∗(τ)dτ ,
provided T¯ > T ≡ θS′−1
(
z(θ) + Ψ(θ)
f(θ)
)
. If T¯ ≤ T then M∗ = 〈q∗(.), t(.), θ˜〉
specifies a full-bunching solution with θ˜ = θ and 〈q∗(θ) = T¯
θ
, t∗(θ) = T¯ 〉 for
all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
4Given that the transfer under second best is strictly decreasing, tb(θ) > tb(θ) for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ], if the budget constraint T¯ ≥ tb(θ) then the second best mechanism is always
feasible.
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REMARK 1 Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that for any given
cut-off point θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ], z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is non-decreasing in θ for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ].
Monotonicity of z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is necessary for the optimal output q
∗(θ) to be
non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. Moreover, assumption 1 also guarantees that
Ψ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Assumption 1, is sufficient for the mono-
tonicity of z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) since it implies and is implied by non-decreasingness
of z(θ) + Ψ(θ)f(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. If the monotonicity of z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is violated
in the non-bunching interval (θ˜, θ], then the analysis can be modified a` la
Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
From Theorem 1 it is obvious that the optimal quantity T¯
θ
for the full
bunching case (that is for T¯ ≤ T) is strictly lower than any q∗(θ) for the
partial bunching case (that is for T¯ > T). Moreover, from Theorem 1 it
also follows that if the budget constraint is not binding, that is if T¯ ≥ tb(θ),
then q∗(θ) = qb(θ) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] since Ψ(θ) = 0. If, instead, T¯ < tb(θ), then
the following two Propositions summarize a comparative study between the
optimal budget-constrained mechanism M∗ and the optimal mechanism M b
under the benchmark model.
PROPOSITION 2 If T¯ < tb(θ), then q∗(θ) < qb(θ) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
PROPOSITION 3 Call θˆ = {θ ∈ (θ, θ) | tb(θ) = T¯}. If T¯ < tb(θ) then
θˆ ≥ θ˜.
Theorem 1 and its two complementary Propositions (2 and 3) describe
the optimal budget-constrained mechanism and compare it with the op-
timal mechanism. While full separability of types is the main property
of the unconstrained mechanism M b, this property does not hold in the
budget-constrained mechanism M∗, at least for the lower cost firms. Hence,
with binding budget constraint, the optimal quantity under the budget con-
strained mechanism is strictly lower than that of the second best mechanism
(see Proposition 2). In the budget-constrained mechanism, there is a con-
flict between the necessity of separability (the IC constraints) and the budget
constraint. Separability of types implies increasing information rents for the
lower cost firms. With limited resources, it becomes impossible to finance
the information rents of the more efficient firms. Hence, there is bunching
for the lower cost firms. However, the regulator limits as much as possi-
ble the region in which the regulatory contract is a bunching contract (see
Proposition 3). For that, the contract offered to the higher cost firms (that is
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firms for which the budget constraint is non-binding) is distorted compared
to the optimal mechanism M b. Reducing the quantities of the less efficient
firms (compared to the optimal mechanism M b), reduces the information
rent, and hence, it is possible to finance separability for a larger fringe of
firms. Without any distortions in quantity, the bunching zone would have
been [θ, θˆ], while by imposing optimal distortions in quantity, the bunching
zone is reduced to [θ, θ˜]. This is shown in Figure 1. The optimal budget-
constrained mechanism, described in the Theorem 1, takes care of the trade
off between the cost of abandoning separability for the more efficient firms
and the cost of larger distortions to preserve it. However, the cost of keeping
separability for high cost firm may be too high. In that case we have a full
bunching solution.
-
6
θ˜
q(.)
θ
θˆ θθ
qb(θ)
q∗(θ)
q∗(θ˜)
qb(θ)
qb(θˆ)
Figure 1: The Optimal Quantities for T¯ = tb(θ) and T¯ ∈ (T, tb(θ)).
In Baron and Myerson (1982), the decision to build up the infrastructure
is itself a regulatory instrument. In their optimal mechanism, the infrastruc-
ture is built whenever the associated surplus is larger than the cost and this
decision does not interfere with the optimal mechanism. Likewise, if, in our
problem, S′(0) is finite, then exclusion of the higher cost firms from the
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mechanism is another instrument that can be used to tackle the problem
of budget constraint. In our problem, the decision to build the infrastruc-
ture can be incorporated ex-post, together with the cut-off point. Given
S′(0) <∞, let θ∗∗ denote the highest type for which q∗(θ∗∗) > 0. Then θ∗∗
and θ˜ are determined by the following conditions:
S(q∗(θ∗∗)) = t∗(θ∗∗),
T¯ = θ˜q∗(θ˜) +
θ∗∗∫
θ˜
q∗(τ)dτ.
It is obvious that θ∗∗ is lower than its corresponding value in the optimal
mechanism M b. Hence, a financial constraint also reduces the probability
F (θ∗∗) that the infrastructure is built. Thus, if S′(0) is finite, then it is
possible that building infrastructure will be delayed due to inadequate funds.
We conclude the analysis of the budget-constrained mechanism with a
comparative static result followed by a simple example. Consider any two
budget constraints T¯1 and T¯2 such that T¯1 < T¯2 ≤ tb(θ). With slight abuse
of notation, let q∗i (θ) be the type contingent output and θ˜i be the cut-off
point, both associated with the budget constraint T¯i for i = 1, 2.
PROPOSITION 4 If T ≤ T¯1 < T¯2 ≤ tb(θ), then Ψ(θ˜1) ≥ Ψ(θ˜2) and
θ˜1 > θ˜2 which together imply q∗1(θ) ≤ q∗2(θ)∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
A reduction in available funds reduces the optimal quantities and the
cut-off point (provided T ≤ T¯1). This comparative static result is intuitive.
Due to the scarcity of resources, the opportunity cost of paying information
rents to the more efficient firms increases and hence the regulator prefers to
save on these rents to finance the infrastructure with its available resources.
This result also explains why for a sufficiently low transfer T¯ (< T), the
budget-constrained mechanism prescribes full bunching.
EXAMPLE 1 In this example we consider a very simple functional form
for the surplus function and assume that f(.) has uniform distribution over
[θ, θ]. In particular, we take the surplus function to be S(q) = 2
√
q. Un-
der these assumptions the optimal budget-constrained mechanism M∗ =
〈q∗(.), t∗(.), θ˜〉 specifies for the partial bunching case the following type con-
tingent quantity-transfer pairs:
q∗(θ) =

θ2
θ˜4
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜)
1
(2(θ−θ˜)+ θ˜2
θ
)2
∀θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]
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t∗(θ) =

T¯ (≡ t∗(θ˜)) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜)
θq∗(θ) +
θ∫
θ
q∗(τ)dτ ∀θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]
The optimal cut-off point θ˜ can be obtained by solving T¯ = θ
2(2(θ−θ˜)θ+θθ˜)
θ˜3(2(θ−θ˜)θ+θ˜2) .
The critical value of the transfer is T = θ
2
θ
3 . Therefore, for all T¯ ≤ T, the op-
timal budget-constrained mechanismM∗ = 〈q∗(.), t∗(.), θ˜〉 gives a full bunch-
ing solution where the optimal quantity-transfer pair is
(
q∗(θ) = T¯
θ
, t∗(θ) = T¯
)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] and the optimal cut-off point is θ˜ = θ.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the problem of financing infrastructure under
asymmetric information, when there is financial constraint. The optimal
budget-constrained mechanism broadly differs from the optimal mechanism
in three respects. Firstly, there is an overall reduction in the quantity of
the public good provided. This makes the budget-constrained solution a
third best one. Hence the efficiency at the top does not hold. Secondly, the
budget-constrained mechanism exhibits a substantial amount of bunching.
Our comparative static results show that as the available resources decreases,
more and more types of firms are bunched. Finally, if the available resources
are too small, there is full bunching. This result is not surprising. If the
available resources are too small, the regulator prefers to use less efficient
regulation and invest the money in infrastructure building rather than in
financing separability.
Given that the budget-constrained solution is a third-best one, there are
welfare losses. The welfare is reduced because each type of firm produces a
lower quantity of the public good and hence the consumer surplus is lower.
Moreover, the welfare is also reduced because there is bunching for the
more efficient firms. To satisfy the wealth constraint, the regulator gives up
separability for the more efficient firms. From our comparative static result
it is obvious that welfare loss is decreasing in available resources (T¯ ).
5 Appendix
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: For an almost everywhere differentiable
mechanism, incentive compatibility (or IC) implies that truth-telling is a
10
best response of the monopolist, that is
{
δ
δθ′ [Um(θ; θ
′)]
}
θ′=θ
= 0 almost
everywhere. This condition implies that t′(θ) = θq′(θ) almost everywhere.
From IC we also know that q(θ) must be non-increasing in θ and hence
t′(θ) ≤ 0 almost everywhere in (θ, θ). For the optimization program [P ∗], let
θ˜ be the first type for which the budget constraint is not binding. Therefore,
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), the budget constraint is binding and for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ], the
budget constraint is not binding (or free).5 This means that t′(θ) = 0 for
all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜) and t′(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ). From IC and PC we also know
that U ′m(θ) = −q(θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] and optimality of the mechanism
guarantees that Um(θ) = 0. Finally, non-increasingness of q(θ) implies that
q′(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜), q′(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ) and since t(.) is not
differentiable at θ˜,
q(θ˜−) ≥ q(θ˜+) (1)
The regulator’s optimization problem [P ∗] can now be divided into two
sub-problems [P ∗1 ] and [P ∗2 ] for the intervals [θ, θ˜) and [θ˜, θ] respectively.
[P ∗1 ] max
θ˜∫
θ
{S(q1(θ))− Um(θ)− θq1(θ)} f(θ)dθ subject to
1. U ′m(θ) = −q1(θ),
2. T¯ − Um(θ)− θq1(θ) = 0,
3. Um(θ) free, θ˜ and Um(θ˜) given, and
4. q1(θ) ≡ q(θ).
[P ∗2 ] max
θ∫˜
θ
{S(q2(θ))− Um(θ)− θq2(θ)} f(θ)dθ subject to
1. U ′m(θ) = −q2(θ),
2. Um(θ) = 0,
3. θ˜ and Um(θ˜) given, and
4. q2(θ) ≡ q(θ).
5Observe that we are assuming that it is possible to find type contingent quantity-
transfer pairs which allows for partial bunching and partial separability. In otherwords, we
are trying to find the optimal constrained mechanism for the case when the available fund
T¯ is above some critical level T which allows for partial bunching and partial separation.
The solution to this program will provide the exact amount of this critical level T.
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[P ∗1 ] and [P ∗2 ] are two optimal control problems. In both these sub-
problems q(.) is the control variable and Um(.) is the state variable. Finally,
θ˜ is the optimal cut-off point that links the two problems.
The Hamiltonian function associated with [P ∗i ] isHi(θ) = {S(qi(θ))− Um(θ)− θqi(θ)} f(θ)−
λi(θ)qi(θ) for i = 1, 2. Here λi(θ) is the co-state (or auxiliary) variable asso-
ciated with the HamiltonianHi(θ) for the type θ. The Lagrangian associated
with the sub-problem [P ∗1 ] is L1(θ) = H1(θ)+µ(θ)[T¯−Um(θ)−θq1(θ)] where
µ(θ) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the type θ.
The necessary conditions for [P ∗1 ] are
[P ∗1 (1)]
δL1(θ)
δq1(θ)
= {S′(q1(θ))− θ}f(θ)− λ1(θ)− θµ(θ) = 0,
[P ∗1 (2)] λ′1(θ) = − δL1(θ)δUm(θ) = f(θ) + µ(θ),
[P ∗1 (3)] λ1(θ˜) is free,
[P ∗1 (4)] λ1(θ) = 0,
[P ∗1 (5)] µ(θ) ≥ 0 and
[P ∗1 (6)] T¯ − Um(θ)− θq1(θ) = 0.
Similarly, the necessary conditions for [P ∗2 ] are
[P ∗2 (1)]
δH2(θ)
δq2(θ)
= {S′(q2(θ))− θ}f(θ)− λ2(θ) = 0,
[P ∗2 (2)] λ′2(θ) = − δH2(θ)δUm(θ) = f(θ),
[P ∗2 (3)] λ2(θ˜) is free and
[P ∗2 (4)] λ2(θ) is free.
From [P ∗1 (2)] we get
λ1(θ) = F (θ) + Ψ(θ) + k1 (2)
where Ψ(θ) =
∫ θ
θ µ(τ)dτ and k1 is the constant of integration.
6 Since Ψ(θ) =
F (θ) = 0 and since λ1(θ) = 0 from [P ∗1 (4)], we get k1 = 0. Therefore, from
(2) we get
λ1(θ) = F (θ) + Ψ(θ) (3)
From [P ∗2 (2)] we get
λ2(θ) = F (θ) + k2 (4)
where k2 is the constant of integration. Since θ˜ is the optimal cut-off point
for the program [P ∗], we get λ1(θ˜) = λ2(θ˜). Then from conditions (3) and
6It is important to note that Ψ′(θ) = µ(θ). This fact will be used later to determine
the functional form of Ψ(θ).
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(4) we get k2 = Ψ(θ˜) and hence
λ2(θ) = F (θ) + Ψ(θ˜) (5)
Substituting (3) in [P ∗1 (1)] and then simplifying it, using q(θ) = q(θ˜) for all
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), we get
S′(q1(θ˜)) = θ +
F (θ) + Ψ(θ) + θµ(θ)
f(θ)
(6)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜).
Similarly, substituting (5) in [P ∗2 (1)] and then simplifying it we get ∀θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]
S′(q2(θ)) = θ +
F (θ) + Ψ(θ˜)
f(θ)
(7)
To show that q(.) is continuous at the cut-off point θ˜, we must show that the
left hand side of [P ∗1 (1)] and [P ∗2 (1)] are the same at θ˜, that is {S′(q1(θ˜))−
θ˜}f(θ˜)− λ1(θ˜)− θ˜µ(θ˜) = {S′(q2(θ˜))− θ˜}f(θ˜)− λ2(θ˜). Using λ1(θ˜) = λ2(θ˜)
we get
S′(q1(θ˜))− S′(q2(θ˜)) = θ˜µ(θ˜)
f(θ˜)
(8)
If µ(θ˜) > 0, then the right hand side of condition (8) is positive. This
means that S′(q1(θ˜)) > S′(q2(θ˜)) and hence by strict concavity of S(.) we
get q1(θ˜)) < q2(θ˜). This violates condition (1). Therefore, it must be the
case that µ(θ˜) = 0 and hence q1(θ˜)) = q2(θ˜).
Therefore, the optimal budget constraint mechanism M∗ for the partial
bunching case satisfies the following three conditions:
(p1) S′(q∗(θ˜)) = θ + F (θ)+Ψ(θ)+θµ(θ)f(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), µ(θ˜) = 0,
(p2) S′(q∗(θ)) = θ + F (θ)+Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] and
(p3) T¯ = Um(θ˜) + θ˜q∗(θ˜)
Here (p1) follows from condition (6), (p2) follows from condition (7) and
(p3) is obtained from [P ∗1 (6)] which gives us the optimal cut-off point θ˜.
We now determine Ψ(θ˜). Integrating condition (6) after substituting
d
dθ [θF (θ)] = θf(θ) +F (θ),
d
dθ [θΨ(θ)] = θµ(θ) +Ψ(θ) and S
′(q(θ˜)) ≡ c(θ˜) we
get
θF (θ) + θΨ(θ) = c(θ˜)F (θ) + k3 (9)
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for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜). Here k3 is the constant of integration. Using F (θ) =
Ψ(θ) = 0 in condition (9) we get k3 = 0. Substituting k3 = 0 in condition
(9) and then simplifying it we get
Ψ(θ) =
(
c(θ˜)− θ
θ
)
F (θ) (10)
Differentiating (10) with respect to θ and then using µ(θ˜) = 0 we get
S′(q(θ˜)) ≡ c(θ˜) =
(
θ˜2f(θ˜)
θ˜f(θ˜)−F (θ˜)
)
. Substituting θ = θ˜ and c(θ˜) in condition
(10) we get Ψ(θ˜) =
(
{F (θ˜)}2
θ˜f(θ˜)−F (θ˜)
)
. Since Ψ(θ˜) =
∫ θ˜
θ µ(τ)dτ and the La-
grangian multiplier µ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), it is necessary that Ψ(θ˜) ≥ 0.
It is obvious that Ψ(θ) = 0 since F (θ) = 0. Therefore, to show that Ψ(θ) ≥ 0
for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) it is now more than enough to show that Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0 for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ). By differentiating Ψ(θ) with respect to θ ∈ (θ, θ) and then setting
it to be non-negative we get (b) θ(1+L′(θ)) ≥ 2L(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). Con-
dition (b) is identical to assumption 1. Hence, Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ)
which implies that Ψ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). This however means that
Ψ(θ) =
( {F (θ)}2
θf(θ)−F (θ)
)
> 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) since our assumption that f(θ) > 0
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] implies that F (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) and since for Ψ(θ)
to be non-negative it is always necessary that θf(θ) − F (θ) > 0. Thus,
conditions (p1), (p2) and (p3) together with Ψ(θ˜) =
(
{F (θ˜)}2
θ˜f(θ˜)−F (θ˜)
)
> 0 gives
us the conditions in Theorem 1 when partial bunching is optimal.
We will show that given Ψ(θ˜) =
(
{F (θ˜)}2
θ˜f(θ˜)−F (θ˜)
)
, q∗(θ) is non-increasing in
θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Observe first that from condition (p1) it follows that q∗(θ) = q∗(θ˜)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜). To show that q∗(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] we have to
show that z¯(θ) ≡ z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. Differentiating
z¯(θ) with respect to θ ∈ (θ˜, θ) and then setting it to be non-negative we
get (c) f
′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ˜))
f2(θ)
≤ 2. To show that condition (c) is true, it is more
than enough to show that f
′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ))
f2(θ)
≤ 2 since Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈
(θ, θ) implies that f
′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ˜))
f2(θ)
≤ f ′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ))
f2(θ)
for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ). From
assumption 1 we know that for all θ ∈ (θ, θ),
θ(1 + L′(θ)) ≥ 2L(θ)
or θ
(
2− f ′(θ)F (θ)
f2(θ)
)
≥ 2L(θ)
or θL(θ)
(
2− f ′(θ)F (θ)
f2(θ)
)
≥ 2
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or 2
(
θ−L(θ)
L(θ)
)
≥
(
θ
L(θ)
) (
f ′(θ)F (θ)
f2(θ)
)
or 2
(
F (θ)
Ψ(θ)
)
≥
(
(F (θ)+Ψ(θ)
Ψ(θ)
) (
f ′(θ)F (θ)
f2(θ)
)
(since Ψ(θ) =
(
L(θ)F (θ)
θ−L(θ)
)
for all θ)
or 2 ≥
(
f ′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ))
f2(θ)
)
Thus from assumption 1, we get f
′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ))
f2(θ)
≤ 2 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ).
Therefore, condition (c) holds. This proves that z¯(θ) ≡ z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is non-
decreasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] and hence q∗(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. Ob-
serve that θ˜ = θ, corresponds to the transfer T = θS′−1
(
θ + F (θ)+Ψ(θ)
f(θ)
)
>
0. Therefore, for all T¯ > T the optimal mechanism is a partial bunching one.
Finally, since the Hamiltonian H2 is concave in q(.) and linear in Um(.), the
necessary conditions are also sufficient for [P ∗2 ]. The necessary conditions
are also sufficient for [P ∗1 ] since the Lagrangian L1(θ) is concave in (q, Um)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜) (see Chiang (1992)).
If T¯ ≤ T, then a partial bunching contract is not feasible. Hence, for
T¯ ≤ T, the optimal solution is a full-bunching one implying q∗(θ) = q¯ for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Given that the mechanism is optimal, from IC and PC it follows
that Um(θ) =
∫ θ
θ q
∗(τ)dτ and hence we get T¯ − θq¯ = (θ − θ)q¯. Therefore,
T¯ = θq¯. Thus, in the full bunching case θ˜ = θ and q∗(θ) = T¯
θ
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
PROOF OF 2: Consider first the partial bunching case, that is consider
T < T¯ < tb(θ). Observe first that the number Ψ(θ˜) is strictly positive. This
implies that for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ], S′−1
(
z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ)
)
< S′−1(z(θ)). Therefore,
q∗(θ) < qb(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. Moreover, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), q∗(θ) = q∗(θ˜) <
qb(θ) since qb(θ) ≥ qb(θ˜) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜). For the full bunching case, that
is for T¯ ≤ T < tb(θ), it is obvious that the optimal fixed quantity T¯
θ
is
strictly smaller than any q∗(θ) for the partial bunching case. Hence the
result follows.
PROOF OF 3: Observe first that by definition θˆqb(θˆ) +
∫ θ
θˆ
qb(τ)dτ = T¯ =
θ˜q∗(θ˜) +
∫ θ
θ˜ q
∗(τ)dτ . Using this observation, we prove the proposition by
contradiction. We first assume that θˆ < θ˜. Then define h(θ) = qb(θ)− q∗(θ)
for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]. Given Proposition 2, h(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]. Using the
observation we get
θˆ(h(θˆ) + q∗(θˆ))− θ˜q∗(θ˜) +
∫ θ
θ˜
h(τ)dτ +
∫ θ˜
θˆ
qb(τ)dτ = 0 (11)
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Since by assumption θˆ < θ˜, from the optimal budget-constrained mech-
anism M∗ we get q∗(θˆ) = q∗(θ˜). Substituting q∗(θˆ) = q∗(θ˜) in (11) we
get
θˆh(θˆ)− (θ˜ − θˆ)q∗(θ˜) +
∫ θ
θ˜
h(τ)dτ +
∫ θ˜
θˆ
qb(τ)dτ = 0 (12)
Since
∫ θ˜
θˆ
qb(τ)dτ ≥ (θ˜ − θˆ)q∗(θ˜), the left hand side of (12) is strictly
positive. Hence we have a contradiction.
PROOF OF 4: From the optimal mechanism in Theorem 1, we know that
T¯i = θ˜iq∗i (θ˜i) +
∫ θ
θ˜i
q∗i (τ)dτ for i = 1, 2. Given that Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0, we have the
following possibilities:
1. θ˜1 > θ˜2 and Ψ(θ˜1) ≥ Ψ(θ˜2) and
2. θ˜1 ≤ θ˜2 and Ψ(θ˜1) ≤ Ψ(θ˜2).
We now show that condition (2) is incompatible with T¯1 < T¯2. Observe
that T¯1 < T¯2 implies that
θ˜1q
∗
1(θ˜1)− θ˜2q∗2(θ˜2) +
θ∫
θ˜2
(q∗1(τ)− q∗2(τ))dτ +
θ˜2∫
θ˜1
q∗1(τ)dτ < 0 (13)
If θ˜1q∗1(θ˜1) ≥ θ˜2q∗2(θ˜2), then we already have a contradiction to condition
(13) since
∫ θ
θ˜2
(q∗1(τ) − q∗2(τ))dτ ≥ 0 and
∫ θ˜2
θ˜1
q∗1(τ)dτ > 0. Therefore, for
condition (13) to be true it is necessary that θ˜1q∗1(θ˜1) < θ˜2q∗2(θ˜2). Moreover,
for condition (13) to hold it is also necessary that θ˜2q∗2(θ˜2) − θ˜1q∗1(θ˜1) >∫ θ˜2
θ˜1
q∗1(τ)dτ . We now show that this condition is not true. Observe first that∫ θ˜2
θ˜1
q∗1(τ)dτ > (θ˜2−θ˜1)q∗1(θ˜2) since q∗1(θ) > q∗1(θ˜2) for all θ ∈ [θ˜1, θ˜2). Observe
next that (θ˜2 − θ˜1)q∗1(θ˜2) ≥ θ˜2q∗2(θ˜2) − θ˜1q∗1(θ˜1). These two observations
together imply that θ˜2q∗2(θ˜2) − θ˜1q∗1(θ˜1) <
∫ θ˜2
θ˜1
q∗1(τ)dτ . Thus, for this case
we get T¯1 > T¯2 which is a contradiction.
Thus, we have proved that only condition (1) is compatible with T¯1 < T¯2.
Hence for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], q∗1(θ) < q∗2(θ).
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